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ATTORNEYS FOR CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PENDING CASES
BARRY J. BERENBERG"
I. INTRODUCTION
or neglected each year in New Mexico.' Some
are
abused
children
of
Thousands
proceedings before the children's court.2
in
protective
up
end
of these children
Traditionally, these children have been represented before the court by a guardian
ad litem.3 In 2005, however, the New Mexico legislature amended the state's Abuse
and Neglect Act, 4 requiring the appointment of a traditional lawyer, called a youth
attorney, for children age fourteen years and older.5 Guardians ad litem and youth
attorneys serve very different roles: the former represent the best interests of the
child as determined by counsel, while the latter represent the expressed wishes of
the child as directed by the child.6 The child advocacy community does not agree on
which of these two methods-the advocate directed "best interests" model or the
client directed "expressed wishes" model-best serves children, or even if either
model is best in all situations.7 Now that the New Mexico legislature has chosen its
side in the debate, though, the state should focus not on which approach is best, but
rather on ensuring that the chosen model meets the needs of the children.8
To that end, this Comment examines the impact of attorney representation on
child protective proceedings, taking into account the effects of New Mexico statutes,
court rules, and constitutional provisions. Each of the parties involved in these

* Class of 2007, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Robert
Schwartz and J. Michael Norwood for their support and guidance on this Comment, as well as Tara Ford of Pegasus
Legal Services and Judy Flynn O'Brien of the Corinne Wolfe Children's Law Center. I would also like to thank my
wife, Lisa, for her support throughout my law school career. My son, Ethan, who did not get to see me finish this
work, was my inspiration for pursuing children's law.
1. N.M. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CmIzEN REv. BD., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1

(2005) [hereinafter CRB, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]. In 2003, the most recent year for which data is available, New
Mexico reported that 6,238 children were substantiated victims of abuse, neglect, and other types of maltreatment.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT
2003, at 30 tbl.3-1 (2005), availableathttp://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programslcb/publications/cm03/cm2003.pdf. From
1990 through 2003, the number of substantiated victims reported each year varied from a low of 3,730 in 1999 to
a high of 8,845 in 1996, with a median of 6,288 victims annually. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF Am., NATIONAL
DATA ANALYSIS SYSTEM: DATA REPORTS, http://ndas.cwla. org/data.stats/access/predefined/Report.asp?ReportID

= 189 (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) (summarizing data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services sources).
2. CRB, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.

3. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10 (1993) (amended 2005); see infra Part I.C.l.
4. NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-1 to -33 (2005).
5. Id. § 32A-4-10; FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, LEGiS. FIN. COMM., S. 47-SB233, Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005)
[hereinafter FISCAL IMPACT REPORT] (listing amendments to the Children's Code); AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS,
HEALTH POLICY COMM'N, S. 47-SB233.669, Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005) (summarizing amendments to the Children's
Code); see infra Part ll.C.2.
6. NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF

CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 5 (2001), available at http://naccchildlaw.org/documentsl
naccrecommendations.pdf [hereinafter NACC RECOMMENDATIONS]; see infra Part H.B.
7. See, e.g., NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 5; JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN

IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS 31 (2d ed. 2001) ("Lawyers have represented children in child-protective
proceedings for almost twenty-five years without a consensus in either the law, the ethical rules, or the scholarly
literature about their role for children.").
8. See NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 5.
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proceedings-children, attorneys, judges, social workers, and others-will be
affected by the 2005 amendment. 9
This Comment focuses on two issues. The first is an examination of the role of
a child's attorney, as defined by the statutes and rules of professional conduct.'0 The
Background section outlines the best interests (advocate-directed) and express
wishes (client-directed) models of child representation," as well as the relevant
statutes and rules in New Mexico.' 2 The Analysis section then examines the
shortcomings in applying current laws to the youth attorney rule and provides
recommendations for implementing the rule in practice. 3
The second issue raised by this Comment concerns the so-called "pending cases"
clause, 4 a constitutional provision unique to New Mexico 15 that could have the
effect of blocking application of the youth attorney rule for some children.' 6 The
Background section reviews the case law related to this clause and suggests a single
doctrine to resolve the inconsistencies in the law that have developed over time.' 7
The Analysis section then shows how a careful interpretation of children's common
law rights to representation 8avoids any conflict between the pending cases clause
and the youth attorney rule.'
I. BACKGROUND
Until relatively recently in American history, children were only occasionally
represented by legal counsel in court proceedings.' 9 It was not until the 1960s that
legal representation for children began to evolve into its own body of law.20 In the
1967 case of In re Gault,the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a child's right to representation in delinquency proceedings. 2' Gault focused attention on children's rights
in general and led the movement for representation in non-delinquency
proceedings.22

9. CRB, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 1; see Univ. of N.M. Inst. of Pub. Law's Corinne Wolfe
Children's Law Ctr., Training on the 2005 Changes to the Children's Code, Youth Attorney Session (June-July
2005) [hereinafter Training Presentation] (providing best practice recommendations for guardians ad litem, youth
attorneys, the Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD), respondent counsel, judges, Citizen Review
Boards (CRBs), and Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs)).
10. See infra Part Il.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Parts Il.C-D.
13. See infra Part IHLA.
14. "No act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence
or procedure, in any pending case." N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 34.
15. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part ll.E.
18. See infra Part 1Il.B.
19. Marvin Ventrel, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children'sLaw and Practice, 32
COLO. LAw. 65, 66 (2003). The history of legal representation for children can be traced back to Roman society,
which appointed "special curators" for children under certain circumstances. Mary E. Hazlewood, Comment, The
New TexasAdLitem Statute: Is It Really Protectingthe Best Interests of Minor Children?,35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1035,
1041 (2004). The "special curators" eventually evolved into the English doctrine of parens patriae, whereby the
state has authority to protect children. Id.
20. Ventrell, supra note 19, at 66.
21. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; see also Ventrell, supra note 19, at 67.
22. See, e.g., Hazlewood, supra note 19, at 1042 ("[In re Gault] highlighted the focus on children's
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Today, the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)
requires representation by a guardian ad litem in dependency proceedings. 2' The
CAPTA regulations do not define the role of the guardian ad litem, requiring only
that "the State must insure the appointment of a guardian ad litem or other
individual whom the State recognizes as fulfilling the same functions as a guardian
ad litem, to represent and protect the rights and best interests of the child."'2 Despite
decades of discussion following the enactment of CAPTA, scholars and legal
organizations have been unable to reach a consensus on appropriate standards for
the representation of children.26 With the passage of the 2005 amendment to the
Abuse and Neglect Act, New Mexico has chosen the standards it will use. The
following sections of this Comment describe those standards.

A. Overview of Child ProtectionProceedingsin New Mexico
An outline of the typical abuse and neglect proceeding will help frame the
discussion of representational standards.27 The central purpose of the Children's
Code is first to protect the best interests of the children covered by its provisions,
and then to "preserve the unity of the family. '' 8 To achieve these goals, the Abuse
and Neglect Act sets out the procedures and timelines that must be followed when

attorneys...."); David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, the New ABA Standardsof Practicefor Lawyers
Who Represent Children in Abuse andNeglect Cases, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETcS 103, 105 ("Ever since...In re Gault,
states have expanded the role of attorneys in juvenile proceedings."); Bridget Kearns, Comment, A Warm Heart but
a Cool Head: Why a Dual GuardianAd Litem System Best Protects Families Involved in Abused and Neglected
Proceedings,2002 Wis. L. REV. 699, 706 ("The nation-wide interest in children's rights generated both by the new
research and by Gault also led the federal government to take action on behalf of abused and neglected children.");
Melissa Maguire, Note, Depriving Children of a Voice Is Not Harmless Error: An Argument for Improving
Children'sRepresentationin MassachusettsThrough StatutoryReform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L REV. 661,664-65 (2005)
("The advancement of children's law began with In re Gault.....
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (2000).
24. 1a § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii). Representation is required only to the extent that states cannot receive federal
funding for certain improvements in child protective services if they do not meet the requirements of CAPTA. Id.
§ 5106a(a). As of 2003, only two states-Indiana and Pennsylvania-did not receive CAPTA funding. Howard
Davidson, New Federal CAPTA Changes: Tips for Advocates, 7 CHILD L PRAC. 133, 133 (2003). In 1999,
California also did not receive CAPTA funding. Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young
Children in Child ProtectionProceedingsShould Be Represented by Lawyers, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (2000).
25. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (2005); see also
Mandelbaum, supranote 24, at 2 n.6.
26. E.g., Hazlewood, supranote 19, at 1043-44 ("In the last several decades, legal scholars.. .have focused
much debate on the proper role of an attorney who represents a child in a custody case.... [U]nresolved arguments
still exist regarding exactly how attorneys or guardians should represent a child."); Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians
AdLitem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings:Clarifyingthe Rules to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327,
328 (1993) ("[S]ince CAPTA, much has been written about.. .what representation of the child should entail. Debate,
however, continues on these fundamental issues...."); Mandelbaum, supra note 24, at 3-4 ("[A] growing number
of scholars have examined and debated the question of what is the appropriate role for the child's representative....
Despite these efforts, much confusion remains.....).
27. The outline presented herein is brief, covering only enough of the procedure to provide a context for the
discussion in the following sections. A detailed description of the proceedings can be found in NEw MEXIco CHILD
WELFARE HANDBOOK: A LEGAL MANUAL ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2003) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE
HANDBOOK].
28. NMSA 1978, § 32A-I-3(A) (1999); State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Maria C., 2004NMCA-083, 1 23, 94 P.3d 796, 803; see also State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. George F., 1998NMCA- 119, 7, 964 P.2d 158, 161 (referring to appointment of a guardian ad litem as "furthering the central
purpose of achieving the child's best interests").
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a child enters the system.2 9 The procedures also serve the express purpose of
"assur[ing] that 'the parties [receive] a fair hearing and their constitutional and other
legal rights are recognized and enforced." 3
An abuse and neglect case begins when the Children, Youth, and Families
Department (CYFD) files a petition alleging abuse or neglect. 3' The child's
representative is appointed by the court upon the filing of the petition. 2 Within ten
days of filing, the court holds a custody hearing.33 If the court finds probable cause
for abuse or neglect, it can either return the child to the parents or award legal
custody to CYFD, pending the adjudicatory hearing.34 The adjudicatory hearing,
which must be held within sixty days of the service of the petition, is a full
evidentiary hearing at which the state must prove the allegations of abuse or neglect
by clear and convincing evidence.35
If the court finds abuse or neglect, it holds a dispositional hearing within thirty
days where it hears evidence and determines the best interests of the child. 36 At the
dispositional hearing, the court decides who should have custody of the child and
orders the implementation of a treatment plan.37 Within sixty days of the disposition,
the court holds an initial judicial review hearing to determine the effectiveness of
the treatment plan. 8
Within six months of that hearing (or thirty days after a judicial determination
that reasonable efforts toward reunification are not required), the court holds an
initial permanency hearing to determine whether the child should be returned home
or remain in CYFD custody.39 If the child is returned home, the case can either be
dismissed or the court can order continuing supervision.' If the case is not dismissed, a second permanency hearing will be held within three months." If the court
finds that reunification is still not possible at that point, it will initiate proceedings
for a permanent guardianship or termination of parental rights (adoption).42
The procedures limit the time under which parents can rehabilitate themselves
and reunite with their children.43 Under federal guidelines, states must move quickly

29. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, 18,94 P.3d at 802.
30. Id. 1 23,94 P.3d at 803-04 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-3(B) (1999)).
31. CHILD WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 1-3. Although the case begins with the filing of the
petition, the proceedings are set in motion a bit earlier. CYFD receives initial allegations of abuse or neglect and
forwards them to local law enforcement for investigation. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-3 (2005). CYFD next receives the
report of the investigation, may conduct an additional investigation, and then decides whether to file a petition. Id.
§ 32A-4-4.
32. Proposed Revisions to the Children's Court Rules, 44 N.M. L. BULL. 22,22(2005) [hereinafter Proposed
Revisions].
33. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-18(A) (2005).
34. CHILD WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 13-5 (citing NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-18(D).
35. Id. at 1-4, 15-1; see NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-19, -21 (1997); id. § 32A-4-20 (2005).
36. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-22(A)--(C) (2005).
37. CHILD WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 1-5. Custody can be awarded to the parent, with or
without protective supervision, to the non-custodial parent, or to CYFD. Id.; see NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-22 (2005).
38. CHILDWELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 1-5; NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-25.
39. CILD WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 1-5, 19-1; NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-25.1.
40. CHILD WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 1-5.

41. Id.; NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-25.1 (2005).
42. CHILD WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 1-6 to -7; see NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-31 to -32
(permanent guardianship); id. §§ 32A-4-28 to -29 (termination of parental rights).
43. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, 21, 94 P.3d 796, 803.
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to find permanent placement for children." Normally, when a child has been in
foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months, proceedings to terminate parental
rights must begin.45 In some cases, however, proceedings can continue for many
years.46
B. Models for Representationof Children
Today, almost all states require children to be represented throughout an abuse
and neglect proceeding. 7 Because of the lack of consensus on representational
standards, each jurisdiction has arguably developed its own model of
representation.48 Even within a given jurisdiction, experts disagree on which model
is actually used and what role the child's representative plays.49 Despite these
differences, the main representational models in use can be broadly categorized as
advocate directed and client directed. 50 Under the advocate-directed model, the child
is represented by a guardian ad litem, who advocates for what he or she believes to
be in the child's best interest. 5' Under the client-directed model, the child is
represented by an attorney who advocates for what the child has expressed as his or
her wishes.52
Under either model, jurisdictions have room to tailor the specific qualifications
and role for each type of representative. 53 Most jurisdictions have adopted advocate-

44. Id. (citing Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 629(a)(7)(A) (2000)).
45. Id. 22,94 P.3d at 803 (citing NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-29(A), (K) (2003) (current version at NMSA 1978,
§ 32A-4-29(A), (G) (2005))). The statute allows for specific exceptions to termination proceedings, such as when
the parent is making substantial progress, a permanent placement plan that does not include termination of parental
rights provides the most appropriate alternative, the child is not capable of functioning if placed in a family setting,
or adoption is not appropriate for the child. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-29(G)(H)-(8).
46. For example, George F. and his younger brother were taken into custody in December 1988 and were
still in state custody in December 1996. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. George F., 1998-NMCA119, 2, 964 P.2d 158, 159; see also infra Part Il.F.3 (discussing the facts of George F.).
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. Marvin Ventrell, Legal Representation of Children in Dependency Court: Toward a Better Model-The
ABA (NACC Revised) Standards of Practice, in NACC CHILDREN'S LAW MANUAL SERIES 167, 169 (1999); see
Mandelbaum, supra note 24, at 27 ("[E]ach state developed its own (and in many regards idiosyncratic) model of
practice."). In summarizing her 1996 survey of U.S. jurisdictions, Jean Koh Peters wrote, "If our survey revealed
one thing, it was chaos. We joked in our office that the 'fifty-plus state' survey revealed fifty-six state systems for
representing children in child-protective proceedings." PETERS, supra note 7, at 32.
49. Ventrell, supra note 48, at 169; see Mandelbaum, supra note 24, at 27-28 ("[Glreat discrepancies
between statutory mandates and what occurs in reality... may be due to differing interpretations of state mandates
by counties, other localities, courts, or individual representatives, or by a combination of some or all of these
factors.").
50. E.g., NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 10-15; Emily Buss, "You're My What?": The
Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyers'Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1700-01 (1996). Other
possibilities include hybrid models, wherein the lawyer represents both positions to the court, or neutral fact finder,
wherein the lawyer simply presents all relevant information to the court. Id. at 1702. Emily Buss, however,
considers these alternatives to be variations of the best interests model. id. Jean Koh Peters points out that focusing
on "best interests" versus "wishes" has the effect of polarizing and distorting discussions on representational
models. PETERS, supra note 7, at 49-50. Abandoning that dichotomy would facilitate discussions and promote the
development of better representational models. See id. at 50.
51. NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 10.
52. id. at 13.
53. See id. at 10-15 (describing the three most common representational roles under the advocate-directed
and client-directed models).
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directed representation through an attorney guardian ad litem1 4 Under this model,
the court appoints an attorney to act as guardian ad litem,55 who uses his or her
judgment to determine the child's best interest. The judgment of the guardian ad
litem takes precedence over the child's expressed wishes.56 Some jurisdictions, like
New Mexico, expand the guardian ad litem's responsibility to the child, beyond the
pure best interests role." Very few jurisdictions have adopted a client-directed
model, in which a traditional attorney essentially treats the child client as an adult
client, advocating for the expressed wishes of the child and being bound by the
child's directives concerning the objectives of the representation.58 States that follow
some form of the client-directed model include Michigan,5 9 Massachusetts, 6°
Minnesota,6 ' Connecticut,62 and Maine.63
Uniform standards for client-directed representation have been proposed. The
American Bar Association (ABA) has adopted standards for a "child's attorney" that
provide for traditional representation but allow the attorney to request appointment
of a separate guardian ad litem when the child cannot express his or her wishes, or
when the attorney believes that the child's expressed wishes would be seriously

54. As of 2001, approximately sixty percent of U.S. jurisdictions followed this model. Id. at 10.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. In Michigan, for example, the guardian ad litem is called a lawyer-guardian ad litem. Id. at 12; MICH.
COmP. LAWS § 712A.17d (2004). Attorney-client privilege applies to the relationship. Id. § 712A.17d(a). The
lawyer-guardian ad litem must also determine the child's expressed wishes, tell the court of those wishes even if
the lawyer-guardian ad litem advocates for a different view, and consider those wishes when making the best
interests determination. Id. § 712A. 17d(i). The expanded responsibility of the New Mexico guardian ad litem will
be discussed in Part I.C, infra.
58. NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 13.
59. Michigan allows appointment of a traditional attorney when the lawyer-guardian ad litem and child
disagree about the child's best interests. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 712A.17d(k)(2) (2004).
60. Massachusetts appoints a traditional attorney and may optionally appoint a guardian ad litem. PETERS,
supra note 7, at 39 n.10. "Counsel for a child owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, zealous
advocacy and competent representation to the child as is due an adult client, consistent with the Massachusetts Rules
of Professional Conduct." COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 1 1.1(d)

(2003), available at http://www.mass.gov/cpcs/manuals/pcmanual/B2aCAFL.pdlf. The guardian ad litem, if
appointed, serves only an investigatory role. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 56A (2005); see also Maguire, supra note
22, at 673 ("Massachusetts.. uses the client-directed approach, appointing a traditional attorney to the child.
Statutory law also grants the court discretion to appoint a [guardian ad litem], but solely in an investigative
capacity.").
61. Minnesota establishes a right to effective assistance of counsel, MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(a) (2005),
requires appointment of an attorney for children ten years and older when the court feels it is appropriate, id. §
260C. 163(3)(b), and requires appointment of a guardian ad litem in all cases, id. § 260C. 163(5)(a). An attorney,
when appointed, is specifically excluded from acting in the role of guardian ad litem. Id. § 260C.163(3)(d).
62. Connecticut requires appointment of counsel, and allows the court to appoint a guardian ad litem when
appropriate:
In any proceeding in which abuse or neglect.. .is alleged by the applicant, or reasonably
suspected by the court, a minor shall be represented by counsel appointed by the court... In all
cases in which the court deems appropriate, the court shall also appoint a person, other than the
person appointed to represent the minor, as guardian ad litem for such minor to speak on behalf
of the best interests of the minor....
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-620 (2000).
63. Maine takes a somewhat different approach than the other states, requiring the guardian ad litem to make
the wishes of the child known to the court and allowing either the guardian ad litem or the child to request
appointment of legal counsel for the child. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(l)(E)-(F) (2001).
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injurious to the child.' The National Association for the Counsel of Children
(NACC) has adopted a revised version of the ABA standards, allowing some bestinterests representation in limited circumstances. 5 Although both sets of standards
express a clear interest for representation by a traditional attorney, 66 each provides
"so many points of discretion and.. .loopholes" that they significantly weaken the
client-directed model.67 No jurisdiction has adopted either the ABA standards or the
NACC revised version.'
C. The Youth Attorney Rule ChangedRepresentationalModels Under the Abuse
and Neglect Act
With the 2005 amendments to its Children's Code, 69 New Mexico has joined the
limited number of states that provide client-directed representation to children. The
changes were developed after several years of work by over 100 attorneys and child
advocates working under the Court Improvement Project of the New Mexico
Supreme Court.70 A primary purpose of the bill was to provide client-directed
representation for children age fourteen and older in abuse and neglect
proceedings. 7' This change was made in order to give older children a stronger voice
in decisions being made about their lives,72 to help transition these children into
adulthood,73 to more closely meet the standards for representation adopted by the
ABA and NACC,74 and to conform to practices in other articles of the Children's
Code.75

64. NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 12.
65. Ventrell, supra note 48, at 172-73; see ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1996), available at http:/www.abanet.org/child/repstandwhole.pdf
[hereinafter STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
66. Donald N. Duquette,LegalRepresentationfor Childrenin ProtectionProceedings:Two DistinctLawyer
Roles Are Required, 34 FAM. LQ. 441,442-43 (2000).
67. Id. at 449-50.
68. NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supranote 6, at 14-15.
69. NMSA 1978, ch. 32A (2005). The amendments were introduced in Senate Bill 233. S. 233, 47th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005).
70. FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; Training Presentation, supra note 9.
71. FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; Training Presentation, supra note 9.
72. FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; Training Presentation, supra note 9.
73. Training Presentation, supranote 9.
74. Id. The ABA expresses a "clear preference" for the appointment of a child's attorney rather than a
guardian ad litem, regardless of age. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 65, § A-2 cmt. In 1997, NACC adopted
the ABA Standards but carved out an exception to client-directed representation when the child is not capable of
directing his or her attorney in a traditional adult role. NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 14-15. While
adoption of the ABA Standards might indicate a preference for client-directed representation over advocate-directed
representation, NACC does not prescribe a specific model but instead suggests that state efforts focus on ensuring
that whichever model the state chooses is implemented in a way that meets children's needs. Id. at 5; see also supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
75. Training Presentation, supra note 9. Under article 2 of the Children's Code, a youthful offender, defined
as a delinquent child fourteen to eighteen years of age who has committed certain felony offenses, NMSA 1978,
§ 32A-2-3(1)(l)-(3) (2005), is subject to adult sentencing at the discretion of the court. Id. § 32A-2-20(A). Under
article 6, a child fourteen years and older who is subject to mental health proceedings shall be represented by an
attorney, id. § 32A-6-4 (1995), and can receive treatment on a voluntary residential basis. Id. § 32A-6-12 (1999).
Only children under fourteen years can receive residential treatment without the child's consent. See id. § 32A-611.1.
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1. Representation by a Guardian Ad Litem Before the 2005 Amendment
Before the 2005 amendment, the Abuse and Neglect Act required that the court
appoint a guardian ad litem for all children.76 The guardian ad htem was to be an
attorney with the duty to zealously represent and protect the child's best interests
before the court.77 When reasonable and appropriate, the guardian ad litem could
also present the child's declared position to the court. 78 The guardian ad litem was
required "to advocate the child's expressed position only to the extent that the
child's desires [were], in the guardian ad litem's professional opinion, in the child's
best interests., 79 Thus, the best interests role was emphasized over the expressed
wishes role. 80 This dual role meant that guardians ad litem did not "function in the
same manner as traditional attorneys." 8 ' Under the best wishes role, the guardian ad
litem acts as an extension of the court, assisting in investigation of the facts and
reporting on placement and treatment.8 2 This form of representation essentially
follows the traditional attorney guardian ad litem model.8 3
2. Representation by a Guardian Ad Litem and Traditional Attorney After the
2005 Amendment
Following the 2005 amendment, the Abuse and Neglect Act maintains
representation by guardian ad litem for children under fourteen years of age.' The
requirement that the guardian be an attorney who zealously represents and protects
the child's best interests remains essentially unchanged, 5 as does the guardian ad
litem's role as an extension of the court.8 6 One significant difference, though, is that
the guardian ad litem is now requiredto present the child's expressed wishes to the

76. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10(C) (1993) ("During an abuse and neglect proceeding, the court shall appoint
a guardian ad litem for a child at the inception of the proceedings.").
77. Id. § 32A-4-10(E) ("The court shall assure that the child receives zealous representation by the child's
guardian ad litem, pursuant to the provisions of Section 32A-1-7...."); id. § 32A-l-7(A) (1995) ("A guardian ad
litem shall zealously represent the child's best interests with respect to matters arising pursuant to the provisions
of the Children's Code."); id. § 32A-1-4(J) (2003) ("'[Guardian ad litem' means an attorney appointed by the
children's court to represent and protect the best interests of the child in a court proceeding....").
78. Id. § 32A-I-7(D)(2) (1995) ("When a child's circumstances render the following duties and
responsibilities reasonable and appropriate, the guardian ad litem shall...present the child's declared position to the
court....").
79. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, '136,955 P.2d 204,
213.
80. Id. 1 36, 955 P.2d at 212-13.
81. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. George F., 1998-NMCA-1 19, 1 11,964 P.2d 158, 161.
82. Id. (H 11-12, 964 P.2d at 161-62; see Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 398-99, 806 P.2d
40, 47-48 (1991).
83. See supranotes 54-56 and accompanying text.
84. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10(C) (2005) ("At the inception of an abuse and neglect proceeding, the court
shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child under fourteen years of age.").
85. Id. § 32A-4-10(F) ("The court shall assure that the child's guardian ad litem zealously represents the
child's best interest...."); id. § 32A-1-7(A) ("A guardian ad litem shall zealously represent the child's best interests
in the proceeding for which the guardian ad litem has been appointed and in any subsequent appeals."); id. § 32A-14(1) ('[G]uardian ad litem' means an attorney appointed by the children's court to represent and protect the best
interests of the child in a court proceeding....).
86. The powers and duties of the guardian ad litem still include such judicial functions as assessing CYFD's
permanency and treatment plans and reporting to the court on compliance with the plans and the child's adjustment
to them. Id. § 32A-I-7(E)(l)-(8).
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court,87 rather than merely being allowed to present them when reasonable and
appropriate. 8' The new requirement to present the child's expressed wishes to the
court makes New Mexico's guardian ad litem very similar to Michigan's lawyerguardian ad litem. 89
For children fourteen and older, the New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Act now
requires appointment of a traditional attorney. 9° If a child is already in the system
when he or she turns fourteen, then under most circumstances the child's guardian
ad litem will continue representing the child as an attorney. 91 The role of the
attorney is to zealously represent the child, 92 in the same manner as the attorney
would represent an adult client.93 Unlike the guardian ad litem, the statute does not
place any additional duties on the child's attorney, such as communicating with
professionals involved in the child's care, attending substitute care review board
hearings, or reporting to the court on the child's adjustment to placement and
CYFD's compliance with the treatment plan.94 The youth attorney rule is, by
definition, a traditional attorney model of representation. 9'
D. Rules of ProfessionalConduct
In addition to the Children's Code, the rules of professional conduct also govern
the conduct of the youth attorney. Among the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, only Rule 1.14 applies specifically to children. 96 New Mexico's version
of Rule 1.14 states that "[wihen a client's ability to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of
minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." 97
The New Mexico rule also allows "[a] lawyer [to] seek the appointment of a
guardian or conservator or take other protective action with respect to a client, only

87. Id. § 32A-I-7(D) ("After consultation with the child, a guardian ad litem shall convey the child's
declared position to the court at every hearing.") (emphasis added).
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10(C) (2005) ("At the inception of the abuse and neglect proceeding,... [i]f the
child is fourteen years of age or older, the court shall appoint an attorney for the child.").
91. Id. § 32A-4-10(E). Exceptions are when the child requests a different attorney, the guardian ad litem
requests to be removed, or the court determines that the appointment of a different attorney is appropriate. Id.
§ 32A-4-10(E)(1)-(3).
92. Id. § 32A-4-10(F) ("The court shall assure that.. .the child's attorney zealously represents the child.").
93. Id. § 32A-1-7.1(A) ("The attorney shall provide the same manner of legal representation and be bound
by the same duties to the child as is due an adult client, in accordance with the rules of professional conduct."); see
also id. § 32A-4-10(A) ("A child subject to the provisions of the Children's Code is entitled to the same basic rights
as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the Children's Code."); id. § 32A-I-16(A) (1993) (providing for the
same).

94. Compare id. § 32A-1-7.1 (2005) (requiring the attorney to represent the child as an adult client), with
id. § 32A-l-7(E)(l)-(8) (defining additional duties of the guardian ad litem), and supra note 82 and accompanying
text (describing the guardian ad litem as an extension of the court).
95. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
96. PETERS, supra note 7, at 42.

97. Rule 16-114(A) NMRA (emphasis added). Rule 16-114(A) is substantially the same as the ABA version,
changing only "the representation" to "a representation" and substituting "diminished" for "impaired." See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUcT R. 1.14(A) (2002).
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when the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client cannot adequately act in the
98
interest.,
own
client's
The Model Rules are more explicit in describing the protective action that may
be taken:
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is
at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and
cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take
reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or
entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate
cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 99
In contrast to the New Mexico rule, the ABA rule emphasizes that the lawyer may
act to prevent harm to the client and specifically allows for consultation with others
and for appointment of a guardian ad litem.'(° The ABA rule also allows for the
lawyer to reveal confidential information, otherwise protected under Rule 1.6, to the
extent reasonably necessary to protect the interests of a client with diminished
capacity.' ° ' The New Mexico rule does not mention confidentiality in particular, but
the commentary notes that the lawyer can be put in an "unavoidably difficult"
position and "may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. ' °2
E. The Pending Cases Clause of the New Mexico State Constitution
While statutes and court rules govern the role and conduct of youth attorneys, the
pending cases clause of the New Mexico Constitution 0 3 affects the implementation
of the youth attorney rule. This clause states that "[n]o act of the legislature shall
affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence or
procedure, in any pending case."" ° This provision is unique to New Mexico, as no
other state has a similar provision in its constitution.0 5 Proceedings that began prior
to the effective date of the amendment might be affected by the clause.
The original purpose of the pending cases clause was to insure that cases were
won on their merits, not through political influence.'0 6 In territorial days, when the
New Mexico Constitution was being drafted, parties to a case often influenced the
legislature to change the rules of evidence or procedure to their benefit.'1 7 Today,
the pending cases clause applies broadly to state regulatory agencies, the courts'
own rule-making authority, 0 8 and other governmental entities. "9 In determining

98. Rule 16-114(B) NMRA.
99. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(B).
100. Compare Rule 16-114(B) NMRA, with MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(B).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuC R. 1.14(C) (referring to Rule 1.6).
102. Rule 16-114 cmt. NMRA.
103. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 34.
104. Id.
105. Aaron Kugler, Rights and Remedies: An Analysis of Article IV, § 34 of the New Mexico Constitution,
35 N.M. TRIAL LAW. 61, 77 (2005).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N.M. 240, 245, 180 P. 294, 295 (1919)).
108. Starko, Inc. v. Cimarron Health Plan, Inc., 2005-NMCA-040, l 7, 110 P.3d 526, 528 (citing Marquez
v. Wylie, 78 N.M. 544, 546, 434 P.2d 69, 71 (1967)).
109. Kugler, supra note 105, at 79.
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whether to apply the provision, the courts focus on the meaning of "pending"" and
have carved out only a few limited exceptions."' The remainder of this section lays
the foundation for analyzing the effect of the pending cases clause on the youth
attorney rule." 2 The following examination of decisions involving the pending cases
clause shows that the courts have adopted sometimes confusing constructions of the
provision, but the case law can be unified by focusing on the functional effects of
legislation rather than on its formal language.
1. "Pending Case" Defined by the Effect on a Right or Remedy
In most situations, the courts apply the pending cases clause when a right has
been affected, whether that right is substantive or procedural. 1'3 In City of Roswell
v. Holmes, the court considered the impact of the clause on a statute that created a
right to enter a motion to dismiss on cases pending when the statute became
effective.' The court found that, as far as the pending cases clause was concerned,
it did not matter if the statute was procedural or substantive. " 5 In either case, the
court said, the statute "undoubtedly" affected a right." 16

110. Id. at 82.
111. Id. at 85. The exceptions to section 34 are constitutional amendments, a party who chooses to follow the
new legislation, and legislation not intended to influence a pending case. Id. at 86. The former two are true
exceptions; the latter is better understood as an application of the statute under the functional definition of "pending
case." See infra note 120.
Part 1l.B.
112. See infra
113. City of Roswell v. Holmes, 44 N.M. 1,5, 96 P.2d 701, 703 (1939).
114. Id. at2,96P.2dat70.
115. Id. at4-5, 96 P.2d at 702-03. The New Mexico Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the pending
cases clause applies to legislation affecting substantive rights. The holding with respect to substantive rights in
Holmes is arguably dicta because the court first found that the statute was procedural, not substantive. Id. at 4, 96
P.2d at 702. This lack of a clear holding may be responsible for later confusion. For example, in Gray v. Armijo,
70 N.M. 245, 252-53, 372 P.2d 821, 827 (1962), the plaintiffs argued that application of a statute, if procedural
rather than substantive, was barred by article IV, section 34. The court based its decision on the meaning of
"pending," rather than the procedural or substantive nature of the statute. Id. In Heron v. Gaylor, 53 N.M. 44, 49,
201 P.2d 366, 369 (1948), the plaintiff argued that anew rule could not affect a substantial right. Without addressing
the substantial nature of the right, the court held that the rule was not a change in procedure contemplated by the
constitution. Id. at 49, 201 P.2d at 370. The court of appeals approached the substantive rights issue in Mon v. Sun
Country Garden Products,Inc., 120 N.M. 261, 264, 901 P.2d 192, 195 (Ct. App. 1995), where the plaintiff argued
that a statute barring a defense was substantive rather than procedural, and thus was valid even though it was passed
after the plaintiff initiated the action. In finding for the plaintiff, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on a New
Mexico federal district court case, which held that the defense had never existed, so a statute prohibiting the defense
could not affect the substantive rights of defendants or plaintiffs. Id. at 265, 901 P.2d at 196 (citing Armijo v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 754 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (D.N.M. 1990)); see also infra notes 320-324 and
accompanying text. Because the statute did not affect a right, it was valid under the pending cases clause. Id. at 265,
901 P.2d at 196. It was not until a later case that the court of appeals explicitly held that the clause applies to
5, 94 P.3d 14, 16 (citing Hillelson v.
substantive rights and remedies. State v. Stanford, 2004-NMCA-071,
Republic Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 36, 37-38, 627 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1981)). Hillelson, the case cited for the holding in
Stanford,dealt with whether a change in a statutory interest rate would be prohibited under the pending cases clause.
Hillelson, 96 N.M. at 37-38, 627 P.2d at 879-80. The court in Hillelson, however, found only that either a right or
a remedy was affected, without stating whether the right or remedy was substantive or procedural. Id. at 38, 627
P.2d at 880. That finding, in turn, relied on two U.S. Supreme Court cases, one that was similarly equivocal, and
one that held that statutory interest is a remedy rather than a right. Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163,
167 (1933) ("The statute in question concerns a remedy."); Morley v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 146 U.S. 162, 170-71
(1892) (declining to distinguish between remedies and substantial rights, but holding that neither could have been
affected).
116. Holmes, 44 N.M. at 5, 96 P.2d at 703.
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This emphasis on the effects of a statute leads to a functional definition of
"pending case." A statute that creates a new procedure does not automatically
invoke the pending cases clause.' Rather, the court determines whether a case is
"pending" under its construction of the particular statute." 8 The court is guided in
this construction by the intention of the clause, which is "'to prevent legislative
interference with matters of evidence and procedure in cases that are in the process
or course of litigation.""'"9 If a change in procedure serves a neutral purpose and is
not enacted to decide the merits of a case, then the case is not pending within the
meaning of the clause. 20
Ultimately, the courts determine neutrality by whether the statute affects a party's
ability to achieve a particular result.' 2' Basing the analysis on the effects of the
statute makes the difference between right and remedy, and between procedure and
substance, irrelevant.'22 For example, a statute that changes the procedure for
appealing an agency decision without affecting access to judicial review does not
invoke the pending cases clause. 23 Similarly, a procedure that sets a specific day for
hearing motions, thereby changing the custom of hearing them upon notice, does not
invoke the clause. 24 In contrast, a statute that changes a remedial interest rate, 25 or
one that changes the maximum sentence available in a criminal case, 26 affects the
outcome of the case and thus does invoke the clause.
2. "Pending Case" Defined by the Formal Language of Article IV, Section 34
Despite the functional, effects-based definition of "pending," the courts
sometimes refer to a formal literal definition. 27 The formal definition states that a

117. In re Held Orders of U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 1999-NMSC-024,
12, 981 P.2d 789, 793.
118. Id. 13, 981 P.2d at 793 (citing Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N.M. 240, 245, 180 P. 294, 295 (1919)).
119. Id. 14, 981 P.2d at 793 (quoting Stockard, 25 N.M. at 244-45, 180 P. at 295).
120. Id. 1 16, 981 P.2d at 794. In effect, the court ties the definition of pending to the intent of the statute.
Although a case may be pending under a formal definition of the term, see infra Part II.E.2, it may not be
functionally pending when considered in the context of the statute. It has been argued that the holding in In re U.S.
West is dicta because the court decided the issue based on the formal definition of pending. Kugler, supranote 205,
at 86, 88 n. 122; see infra note 127. As argued in this Comment, however, the formal definition is merely a specific
application of the functional definition. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. Therefore, the conclusion based
on the formal definition is not necessary after the court's initial conclusion based on the functional definition. The
holding based on the formal definition, then, is the dicta.
121. State v. Stanford, 2004-NMCA-071, 5, 94 P.3d 14, 16 (citing Hillelson v. Republic Ins. Co., 96 N.M.
36, 37-38, 627 P.2d 878, 879-880 (1981)).
122. Id.; see supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
123. In re U.S. West, 1999-NMSC-375, 1 16, 981 P.2d at 794 (holding that legislation that serves "a neutral
purpose of providing an orderly procedure for the transfer of [functions from one agency to another] without
impairing an aggrieved party's right to meaningful judicial review" is consistent with "'the spirit and beneficial
purpose"' of article IV, section 34 (quoting State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Faircloth, 34 N.M. 61, 64, 277 P. 30,
31 (1929))).
124. Heron v. Gaylor, 53 N.M. 44, 49, 201 P.2d 366, 369-70(1948).
125. Hillelson, 96 N.M. at 38, 627 P.2d at 880 (holding that "a change in [statutory] interest affects either the
rights or remedies of the parties").
126. Stanford, 2004-NMCA-071,
7, 94 P.3d at 17 (holding that an amendment to the habitual offender
statute that removes enhancement of the defendant's sentence was not a "neutral legislative act in that.. .it can
benefit a defendant and affect a right or remedy of the State").
127. In re U.S. West, 1999-NMSC-024, 17, 981 P.2d at 794 (finding that, at least for this case, a "more
literal reading of the 'pending case' requirement" results in the same conclusion as the functional analysis).
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case becomes pending when it is "filed on the docket of some court"'2 8 and is no
longer pending after a final judgment is entered. 29 The courts have recognized
exceptions to this "final judgment" rule, such as when a judgment remains under
control of the issuing court 30 or when "subsequent district court proceedings can be
traced to appellate remand instructions or an opinion that directs a party to a new
cause of action."' 3' These exceptions, however, are simply situations when legislation can affect the outcome of a case despite the entry of a final judgment. Viewed
in this manner, the combination of the formal definition and its exceptions can be
seen as equivalent to the functional definition.'3 2
F. Illustrative Cases
The challenges presented by the youth attorney amendment to the Abuse and
Neglect Act are best understood in the context of actual cases. 33 Four New Mexico
cases, described in this section, show some of the problems that can arise when a
guardian ad litem provides representation. The amended statute, by appointing an
attorney, solves some problems while at the same time creating new ones.
1. State ex rel. Children, Youth & FamiliesDepartment v. Esperanza M.
Problems can arise when a guardian ad litem finds that the child's best interests
conflict with the child's expressed wishes. Esperanza M. was thirteen years old"M
when she told a school counselor that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive

128. Id. 113, 981 P.2d at 793 (quoting Romero v. N.M. Health & Env't Dep't, 107 N.M. 516, 519, 760 P.2d
1282, 1285 (1988)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Marquez v. Wylie, 78 N.M. 544, 546,434 P.2d 69, 71(1967)).
131. Id. (quoting Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Regents of N.M. State Univ., 115 N.M. 229, 237, 849 P.2d
372, 380 (Ct. App. 1993)).
132. Courts trace the functional definition of pending back to Stockard. See, e.g., In re U.S. West, 1999NMSC-024, 1 14,981 P.2d at 793; Starko, Inc. v. Cimarron Health Plan, Inc., 2005-NMCA-040, 917, 110 P.3d 526,
528; State v. Stanford, 2004-NMCA-071, 5, 94 P.3d 14, 16. Stockard, though, combined the functional and formal
definitions by noting that "[t]he evident intention of the Constitution is to prevent legislative interference.. .in cases
that are in the process or course of litigation.. .and which have not been concluded, finished, or determined by a final
judgment." Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N.M. 240, 245, 180 P. 294, 295 (1919). Immediately thereafter, the court
stated that "[sluch a provision.. .does not apply to a case like the present one, where a final judgment was obtained
Id. In other words, once a final judgment has been rendered, legislation
long prior to the enactment of the law...."
cannot affect the outcome of a case, and there is no reason to apply the pending cases clause. This is the functional
definition of "pending case." The so-called exceptions to the "final judgment" rule, see supra notes 130-131 and
accompanying text, are instances where legislation can still affect the outcome of a case despite the entry of a final
judgment and thus are merely applications of the functional definition. These situations must be distinguished from
the true exceptions noted at supra note 111, which are situations when, despite the effect of legislation on a pending
case, the courts do not apply the pending cases clause.
133. See, e.g., Jennifer Paige Hanft, Attorney for Child Versus Guardian Ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a
Hybrid, but Is It a Formula for Malpractice?, 34 LAND & WATER L REv. 381, 383 (1999) (using Clark v.
Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 1998), to exemplify the difficulties that arise from failing to define the duties and
roles of a guardian ad litem under Wyoming law). Other authors use hypothetical situations, which have the
advantage of including more issues within a single fact pattern. See, e.g., Mandelbaum, supra note 24, at 9; Michael
D. Drews & Pamela J. Halprin, Note, Determiningthe Effective Representationof a Child in OurLegal System: Do
CurrentStandardsAccomplish the Goal?, 40 FAM. Cr. REV. 383, 384 (2002).
134. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 913, 955 P.2d 204,
206.
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father.'35 During a psychiatric examination, however, Esperanza said that she felt
extreme pressure to protect her family and wanted to testify so that "she could lie
and convince the judge that the abuse never occurred."' 36 Esperanza was not allowed
37
to testify because the psychiatrist thought it would be psychologically damaging.'
The children's court found that Esperanza had been neglected and abused.138
Esperanza's parents appealed.' 39 Esperanza would have been at least fourteen years
old when the appeal was heard." Before the appeal, but after the conclusion of the
original proceedings, the children's court allowed Esperanza's original guardian ad
litem to withdraw and appointed a new guardian ad litem to represent Esperanza
incident to the appeal.""
Upon appeal, Esperanza's parents sought to strike the new guardian ad litem's
answer brief.142 The guardian ad litem thought that it was in Esperanza's best
interests to represent that Esperanza had been abused, despite her denial. "4' The
parents argued that such a contradictory position was contrary to the role of the
guardian ad litem, or at least required the appointment of separate counsel for
Esperanza.'" The guardian ad litem's brief, however, had also noted Esperanza's
disagreement. 45 The court held that this approach properly balanced the guardian
ad litem's dual duties of representing Esperanza's best interests and advocating her
expressed position."
2. State ex rel. Children, Youth & FamiliesDepartmentv. Candice Y.
In another case illustrating the possible conflicts between representing a child's
best interests and advocating for a child's expressed wishes, Candice Y. reported
that her stepfather had sexually abused her, but later recanted her story."'7 Unlike in
Esperanza's case, the court allowed Candice to testify at her preliminary hearing."' 8
Candice stated that she did not remember what she had said earlier and that she had
made up the abuse so that her stepfather would get marriage counseling. 49 The
children's court concluded that Candice had been neglected or abused. 50

135. Id. 1 2, 955 P.2d at 206.
136. Id. 5, 955 P.2d at 207.
137. Id.
138. Id. 1 1,955 P.2d at 206.
139. Id.
140. Esperanza was born on July 8, 1982, id. 1 3, 955 P.2d at 206, and the case was decided in 1998.
141. Id. 1 35, 955 P.2d at 212. Although the appellate court did not say why the children's court allowed the
original guardian ad litem to withdraw, it later noted that the original guardian ad litem's representation was
"materially deficient" and failed to meet the standards of the Children's Code. Id. 40, 955 P.2d at 213.
142. Id. 35, 955 P.2d at 212.
143. See id. 38, 955 P.2d at 213.
144. Id. 35, 955 P.2d at 212.
145. Id. 38, 955 P.2d at 213.
146. Id. 39, 955 P.2d at 213.
147. State ex reL Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Candice Y., 2000-NMCA-035, ft 3-4,999 P.2d 1045,
1049.
148. See id. 9, 999 P.2d at 1049.
149. Id.
150. Id. 5, 999 P.2d at 1049.
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Like in EsperanzaM., the guardian ad litem told the children's court that Candice
5
had lied in her testimony at the preliminary hearing.' ' Candice had become
extremely hostile toward her guardian ad litem and clearly stated that she did not
want the proceedings to continue. 5 2 The guardian ad litem decided to proceed with
the case and the investigation without Candice' s cooperation.' 53 The children's court
ad litem. 5 4
denied the requests of Candice and her parents to remove the guardian
The court of appeals upheld that decision, noting that, as in Esperanza M., the
guardian ad litem's duty is to zealously represent the child's best interests, even
when that means contradicting the child's story.'55
3. State ex rel. Children, Youth & FamiliesDepartmentv. George F.
The rules of professional conduct can affect the interaction of the child's counsel
with CYFD, not just with their clients. George F. and his younger brother, Frank F.,
were taken into state custody in December, 1988 after they had been physically and
sexually abused. 5 6 In addition to the emotional problems caused by the abuse,
George was also deaf, legally blind, and communicated only by sign language."'
Eight years later, in December 1996, both children15 8had endured multiple foster
placements and were still in the custody of the state.
In May 1996, the children's court ordered CYFD to secure long-term placement
for George. 5 9 Concerned about the lack of staff who had experience dealing with
George's problems at the proposed institutional placement, George's guardian ad
litem attempted to communicate ex parte with CYFD social workers."W CYFD
prohibited the social workers assigned to the case from communicating with the
guardian ad litem.' 6' CYFD' s attorney considered the social workers to be his clients
and the guardian ad litem to be an adversarial party.'6 2 Communications with the
social workers would thus violate "the ethical rule prohibiting attorneys from
communicating with a party they know to be represented by counsel about the
subject of the representation."'' 63 The children's court allowed the communications
on the grounds that65 social workers are not clients of CYFD, 64 and the ruling was
upheld on appeal.

151. Id. 29, 999 P.2d at 1053.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. id. 31,999 P.2d at 1054. The court may even have backed off the requirement in EsperanzaM. to also
advocate the child's expressed position, see supra note 147 and accompanying text, by arguing that "[tlhe guardian
ad litem had no duty, however, to advance Candice's recantation or revisionist story, if she did not believe it."
Candice Y., 2000-NMCA-035, 131, 999 P.2d at 1054.
156. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. George F., 1998-NMCA-1 19, 1 2,964 P.2d 158, 159.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. 1 3, 964 P.2d at 159.
160. Id.
161. Id. 1 4, 964 P.2d at 159.
162. Id.
163. ld. (citing Rule 16-402 NMRA).
164. Id. 1 5, 964 P.2d at 160.
165. Id. 1 16, 964 P.2d at 163.
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4. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Departmentv. Joanna V.
This final case illustrates the conflicts that can arise when a guardian ad litem
changes roles to that of an advocate. Joanna V. was fourteen years old when CYFD
initiated abuse and neglect proceedings against her mother. 66 Following a fight at
school, and while still in state custody, Joanna entered into delinquency
proceedings.167 The guardian ad litem who represented Joanna in the abuse and
neglect proceedings also represented her as an attorney in the delinquency
proceedings. 68 Joanna pled guilty to one of the charges 69 and then attempted to
withdraw her plea on the grounds that the dual role of her attorney/guardian ad litem
created a conflict of interest. 70 The state supreme court recognized the "gravity of
the potential conflict" when one attorney represents a child in different roles in the
two proceedings,' 7 ' but nevertheless found no actual conflict.7 7 The court also
recognized that, in most cases, the child is unlikely to understand the subtle
differences between an advocate and a guardian ad litem and will be confused when
7
one attorney acts in both roles. 1
III. ANALYSIS
The youth attorney rule faces threats from two fronts: statutory ambiguities
leading to the erosion of children's new rights and constitutional impediments to
application of the rule. As the preceding sections have shown, the intent of the youth
attorney rule is to provide traditional adult representation to children fourteen and
older. 174 The limited guidance provided by the Children's Code and the rules of
professional conduct allows children with "traditional adult representation" to be
treated differently than adults.' Youth attorneys could even act as a guardian ad
litem, 17 6 perhaps out of fear that a child would be left unprotected.' 71 7 Youth attorneys
and the courts together, however, provide at least as much protection as the current
system. 7 1Furthermore, guardians ad litem who transition into youth attorneys have
a unique opportunity to help their clients avoid the confusion that can sometimes
79
accompany client-directed representation. 1
In addition to the uncertainty over the role of the youth attorney, the pending
cases clause of the state constitution, on its face, blocks the application of the youth
attorney rule altogether for certain children. 80 The youth attorney rule does not

166. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Joanna V., 2004-NMSC-024, 2, 94 P.3d 783, 784.
167. Id. 3, 94 P.3d at 784-85.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. 1 8, 94 P.3d at 786. Joanna merely asserted a conflict; she described neither the nature of the conflict
nor its consequences. Id.
171. Id. 10, 94 P.3d at 786.
172. Id. 17, 94 P.3d at 787.
173. Id. 16, 94 P.3d at 787.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra Part ll.C.
See infra Part nl.A.1.
See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text
See infra Part IU.A.3.
See infra Part IH.B.
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change the possible outcomes of child protective proceedings, so such proceedings
are not "pending cases" under the formal definition of "pending."'' Functionally,
though, the rule can change the actual outcome of the proceeding, which should
make the proceedings "pending cases."' 82 Under the common law, however, children
have a right to representation of their choice, so the youth attorney rule does nothing
more than codify an existing right. 83 This takes the proceedings out of the
functional definition of "pending cases," avoiding the constitutional prohibition and
allowing the appointment of youth attorneys for all children."
A. Defining the Role of the Child's Attorney in New Mexico
Determining the role of the child's attorney can be difficult.'85 The confusion
noted about the role of children's representatives in the different states extends to
the role of representatives within a single state.'86 Often, the role of the representative is not well-defined and can only be determined through an "exhaustive search
of statut[es], judicial rule[s], ethical rules, [and] case law."' 87 Such searches may not
be easy when the relevant sections are scattered throughout different parts of the
state code. 88 In New Mexico, the role of the guardian ad litem is defined in three
different sections of the Children's Code located in two different articles' 89 and is
further refined in case law."9 Ultimately, the statutes and rules may not show how
children are represented in practice, so new representatives must talk to actual
practitioners.' 9' This ambiguity leads many lawyers to make their own decision
regarding their proper role, leading to confusion among all people involved in child
protective proceedings and a reduction in the quality of legal representation.192 To
avoid confusion, states should clearly articulate the standards governing the role of
the child's representative' 93 and use precise language in their statutes.94

181.

See infra Part IH.B.I.

182. See infra Part m.B.2.
183. See infra Part Ill.B.3.
184. See infra Part II.B.3.
185. Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children in Dependency Cases, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1858 (1996) ("The fundamental responsibilities of the child's attorney have historically
been difficult to pin down.").
186. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
187. PETERs, supra note 7, at 41 (footnote omitted).
188. Peters uses Connecticut as an example where, before 1996, child protective proceedings were defined
in the family law title of the state statutes, but the role of the guardian ad litem was defined in the social and human
services and resources title-without a cross-reference between the sections. Id. at 41 n. 12. A number of "extremely
careful" studies had missed the statutory provision. Id.
189. See supra notes 84-86.
190. See, e.g., supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
191. PETERS, supra note 7, at 41-42.
192. DONALD N. DUQUETrE Er AL., GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING
PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN, ch. VII (1999), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20041009213315/http://

www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/adopt02/02final.htm.
193. Id.
194. See PETERS, supra note 7, at 39 n.10 (noting that "[w]ords like 'represent' and 'advocate' suggest
traditional legal counsel, but are compromised by association with words like 'protect' and 'best interests"').
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1. The Role of the Youth Attorney as Defined by Statute and the Rules of
Professional Conduct
The 2005 amendment to the New Mexico Children's Code created a new
statutory right to representation by a traditional attorney for children fourteen years
of age and older.' The statute clearly requires the youth attorney to represent the
19 6
child as an adult and to follow the standard rules of professional conduct.
Interpreting these rights requires not just reference to the statutory language itself,
but also to "the legislative purposes expressed in the [Children's] Code."' 97
Comparing the current version of the statute with the pre-amendment version can
indicate the legislature's intent."' More specifically, the adoption of language that
"children are to be treated the same as adults unless the Children's Code specifies
otherwise" indicates that the legislature intended for legal issues related to children
to be governed-by the same standards that apply to adults. 99
Governing children under the same standards as adults does not mean that
children will always be treated in exactly the same way as adults.2°° The rules of
professional conduct provide some limited guidance for lawyers who represent
children. 20' Under the New Mexico rules, an attorney must maintain a normal
relationship with a minority client "as far as reasonably possible., 20 2 While it may
be possible for an attorney to have a lawyer-client relationship with an older child
that is "substantially similar" to the attorney's relationship with an adult, the rules
provide no guidance as to "where and how the relationships are to differ., 20 3 The
rules simply require the lawyer to evaluate the child client for an impairment based
on minority, in the same way the lawyer evaluates the adult client for an impairment
based on "mental disability or... some other reason. ' '2 4 The rule is the same for child
and adult, and thus the representation is consistent with the statutory mandate for the
youth attorney to provide children with "the same manner of legal representation
and be bound by the same duties to the child as [to] an adult client. 20 ' The
difference, of course, is that the child client can be considered impaired based solely
on age and thus can be treated differently than an adult who is unimpaired. 2°
2. Interpreting the Role of the Youth Attorney Through New Mexico Case
Law
Rule 16-114 in practice provides "remarkably little guidance" regarding when an
attorney should seek the appointment of a guardian or what the protective action
195. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 93.
197. Doe v. State, 100 N.M. 579, 581, 673 P.2d 1312, 1314 (1984) (citing In re Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 482, 542
P.2d 61, 62 (Ct. App. 1975)).
198. Id. at 582-83, 673 P.2d at 1315-16.
199. Id. at 583, 673 P.2d at 1316.
200. See infra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
201. PETERS, supra note 7, at 42.
202. Rule 16-114(A) NMRA; see also supra Part H.D.
203. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor Determining the Role of Counselfor Children, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1399, 1401 (1996).
204. Rule 16-114(A) NMRA.
205. NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-7.1 (2005).
206. Rule 16-114(A) NMRA.
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might comprise .2 7 Likewise, New Mexico case law provides little additional help.
Only three appellate opinions reference rule 16-114.208 Interestingly, all three cases
involved children's court cases that fell under the Abuse and Neglect Act: two
involved the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the mother in termination of
parental rights proceedings, 2° and one involved the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for the child in a protective proceeding.21 ° In the case of Stella P., the mother's
attorney recognized the mother's mental illness and asked the court to appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the child's best interests. 21 Although the appointment
was based on mental illness, not minority, the case shows that
the courts interpret
21 2
Rule 16-114 to allow the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

In Esperanza M., the case most relevant to the youth attorney rule, the court
determined that a guardian ad litem can both represent a child's best interests and
present the child's expressed wishes to the court, even when those interests and
wishes conflict.1 3 Although the court based its decision on the dual role defined in
section 32A-1-7 of the Children's Code,214 it also noted that the dual role is
consistent with the rules of professional conduct.2 5 The court observed that Rule 16102(A) requires a lawyer to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation. 2t 6 In this case, the child's objective was to protect her family by
testifying that she had never been abused.217 The guardian ad litem's position in
contradiction of this objective was consistent with Rule 16-102(A) because, under
Rule 16-114(A), the representative's relationship with the client is to be informed
by any impairments to the "client's ability to make adequately considered decisions
'
in connection with the representation. "218
Although the court's reasoning was dicta,
it relied only on the rules of professional conduct, and not on the representative's
statutory role as a guardian ad litem.

2t 9

The rules of professional conduct, however,

207. See PETERS, supra note 7, at 44. Peters analyzed a version of ABA Model Rule 1.14 that was identical,
in both the text of the statute and the commentary, to the current New Mexico Rule 16-114. Citing to the literature,
Peters quotes various descriptions of Model Rule 1.14, including "unhelpful[]," "inadequate," "confusing,"
"incoherent," "ambiguous," and "provid[ing] only superficial guidance." Id. at 44 n. 14.
208. The three cases are State ex rel. Children, Youth & FamilesDepartment v. Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100,
986 P.2d 495, State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Departmentv. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 955 P.2d
204, and State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Lilli L, 121 N.M. 376, 911 P.2d 884 (Ct. App.
1995).
209. Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100, 986 P.2d 495; Lilli L, 121 N.M. 376, 911 P.2d 884. Lilli L involved the
appointment of an attorney or guardian ad litem for a minor parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding
under Rule 1-017(C) NMRA. Lilli L, 121 N.M. at 378, 911 P.2d at 886. The case is not important for this
discussion because, although the court quoted Rule 16-114, it did not explain how---or if-that rule affected the
decision. Id at 378-79, 911 P.2d at 886-87.
210. EsperanzaM., 1998-NMCA-039, 955 P.2d 204. For a discussion of EsperanzaM., see supraPart Il.F. i.
211. Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100, 4, 986 P.2d at 497. The guardian ad litem was appointed in addition to
the attorney, not instead of the attorney. See id. 9, 986 P.2d at 499 (referring to the presence of both an attorney
and a guardian ad litem at hearing).
212. The rule only mentions the appointment of a guardian or conservator, but it also allows for "other
protective action." Rule 16-114 NMRA; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part Il.F.1.
214. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 38, 955 P.2d at 213.
215. Id. 37, 955 P.2d at 213.
216. Id.
217. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
218. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 37, 955 P.2d at 213.
219. See id. The court in EsperanzaM. reasoned that the dual role of the guardian ad litem "conforms to the
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do not support the court's conclusion: advocating a position determined by the
representative and not the client violates the duties not to "assert personal
knowledge of facts not in issue" and not to "state a personal opinion...not supported
by the evidence as to the justness of a cause. 220
Youth attorneys must be careful not to use the reasoning from Esperanza M. to
justify acting in the role of a guardian ad litem. 22' By providing a traditional attorney
for children fourteen and older, the legislature has implicitly adopted the rule that
"counsel for unimpaired children are obliged by the canons of their profession to
vigorously seek to achieve the outcomes dictated by their clients. 222 If the youth
attorney determines that the child is impaired by minority, then the attorney should
determine the extent to which the child can set the objectives of the representation,
consistent with the intent behind the youth attorney rule. 223 Any move away from
client-directed representation goes contrary to the intent of the youth attorney rule.224
When the child is impaired by minority, however, allowing the child to have as

Rules of Professional Conduct." Taking a position before the court contrary to the client's objectives directly
violates the duty to abide by a client's decisions. Rule 16-102(A) NMRA; see Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039,
37, 955 P.2d at 213. If taking such a position is to be consistent with that duty, then there must be a provision
elsewhere in the rules that allows the attorney to take such a contrary stance. See Guggenheim, supra note 203, at
1411 (noting that there can be no justification for taking a position contrary to that of a client-child considered
"unimpaired" under the Model Rules because "the law unambiguously authorizes the child[] to set the objectives
for the case"). Esperanza M. construed Rule 16-102(A) in conjunction with Rule 16-114(A), the latter of which
allows the normal lawyer-client relationship to be limited by the client's minority or other impairment. Rule 16114(A) NMRA; see EsperanzaM., 1998-NMCA-039, 1 37, 955 P.2d at 213. When the lawyer-client relationship
is so limited, the lawyer can take "other protective action" in order to protect the "client's own interest." Rule 16114(B) NMRA. In EsperanzaM., the court apparently believed that the role of a guardian ad litem falls under "other
protective action."
220. Rule 16-304(E) NMRA. The New Mexico rule is substantially the same as Model Rule 3.4(e). Requiring
the representative to advocate his or her own conception of the child's best interests requires the representative to
advocate a personal view in contravention of Rule 16-304(E). Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for
Children,27 FAM. L.Q. 349, 356 (1993); see also Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be RepresentedBut Not Heard:
Reflections on Legal Representationfor Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 101 (1984) ("[R]equiring the lawyer to
advocate the position he thinks most appropriate.. apparently contravenes the traditional prohibition against lawyers
expressing their personal views to the factfinder."). This problem only arises because the court in Esperanza M.
attempted to reconcile the role of the guardian ad litem with the rules of professional conduct. By relying instead
solely on the statutory role of the guardian ad litem, any question of interpreting the rules to allow a traditional
attorney to act as a guardian ad litem can be avoided. The better approach is to recognize that certain statutory or
customary tasks of the guardian ad litem are not the function of a traditional attorney. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,
supra note 65, § A-2 cmt.
221. Aside from the reasoning in Esperanza M., Rule 16-114 provides sufficient latitude for the youth
attorney to act in almost any role. The rule "fails to explain how to determine when not to treat a minor as a normal
client or how the child-client should then be treated." Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speakingfora Child: The Role
of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REv. 681, 689 (1987). This ambiguity allows attorneys to make
subjective decisions about their role in the case and to advocate their own view of what is "right," even if contrary
to the child's expressed wishes. Id. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted, "Even where it is undisputed that
a child and her attorney disagree, the law is unclear as to whether the attorney is always bound by her minor client's
decision when the attorney feels that the child's decision is not in her own best interest." Adoption of Erica, 686
N.E.2d 967, 973 n.9 (Mass. 1997). This line of arguments parallels Duquette's criticism of the ABA and NACC
Standards. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. When the lawyer's "individual decision about a child's
impairment... is not reviewed by any court and is not based on objective and reviewable criteria... [then] unfettered
lawyer discretion enters into the lawyer-child client relationship." Duquette, supra note 66, at 453.
222. Guggenheim, supra note 203, at 1412.
223. See id.
224. See supra notes 71, 93 and accompanying text.
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much say as possible in the objectives of representation meets the legislative intent
of providing a "transition" period into adulthood.225
Giving a child who is partially impaired by minority some role in setting
objectives-if not a significant role-does not mean that the child will be left
unprotected. Children will be competent to make some decisions, depending upon
the nature of the issue and the extent of their impairment.226 The judge, however, has
the ultimate duty to determine the child's best interests, which allows the youth
attorney to more freely advance the child's expressed wishes.227 In fact, an attorney
who determines the child's best interests necessarily relies on his or her own values
and biases, with the result that the advocated position may not represent the child's
best interests as they would be viewed by the child, the parents, or the community.22
Furthermore, children's lawyers acting as traditional attorneys find that children
have "considerable wisdom," often making decisions about their own best interests
that "prove[] at least as sound as that of the adults who have substituted their own
best judgment. '229 Finally, when attorneys act against the child's wishes, the child
can often effectively block the implementation of any decision.2 30
3. Managing the Transition from Guardian Ad Litem to Youth Attorney
The discussion of impairment resulting from a child's minority must consider not
just the child's understanding of the proceedings, but also the child's understanding
of the role of counsel. 23' The role of the traditional attorney easily confuses children.
Young clients react to attorneys by asking "you're my what? '2 32 One children's
lawyer describes the common scenario:

225. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
226. Lyon, supranote 221, at 699. A child may be able to express a reasoned preference on some issues but
not others, meaning that capacity does not have to be an "all-or-nothing" decision. Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation
of the Child in ProtectionProceedings:The Determination of Decision-MakingCapacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 310
(1983). The ABA Standards for a Child's Attorney recognize that the children may be able to determine some
positions in their own case but not others, "depending upon the particular position and the circumstances prevailing
at the time the position must be determined." STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 65, § B-3 cmt.
227. Buss, supra note 50, at 1703; Wilber, supra note 220, at 354 ("If the child advocates an obviously
unwise course of action, presumably the judge will not adopt it."). Lyon proposes that Model Rule 1.14 be amended
to require the judge to determine, in all cases, whether the minor client is competent to direct his or her attorney.
Lyon, supra note 221, at 694-95. The only way that a child can be harmed by the youth attorney advocating the
child's expressed wishes rather than the child's best interests is if the attorney "somehow fool[s] everyone else in
the courtroom, with the result that the court will enter an order.. .antithetical to the child's best interests. This defies
reality." Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Proceedingsin Florida,25 NOVA L. REV.
769, 809-10 (2001). One risk, though, is that the other parties in the proceeding will not be adequately represented,
and the judge will not hear all points of view. Ramsey, supranote 226, at 323.
228. Dale, supra note 227, at 810 (referring to the works of Jean Koh Peters, Martin Guggenheim, and Randi
Mandelbaum).
229. Buss, supra note 50, at 1704; Wilber, supra note 220, at 354 ("The ability of children to reach
'considered judgments' may be underestimated. Many children, particularly adolescents, are as capable of rational
decision making as adult litigants."); see also Guggenheim, supra note 220, at 99 ("[fIt is unlikely that the attorney
will be able to resolve effectively the often complex and value-laden issue of what is best for the child.").
230. Buss, supra note 50, at 1704.
231. Id. at 1706. "The child client must be informed about the responsibilities and obligations of the
representative, as well as the ability and requirements of the representative to accomplish these things." Ventrell,
supra note 48, at 9.
232. Buss, supra note 50, at 1699.
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In my practice, I have assumed the expressed interest, or "traditional attorney"
role, and have sought to take direction from my clients about which objectives
to pursue. In soliciting their direction, I repeatedly explain to my clients that they
are in charge, that I will fight for what they want, as long as they tell me what
to fight for.
What I have found, however, is that, for many of my clients, even the teenagers among them, the message does not sink in. They continue to assume that
I will take whatever action I think is right, and that I stand united with the public
child welfare agency in controlling their fate. For many of my clients, despite
my frequent protestations to the contrary, I am a part of the all-powerful "you
all" that gives and takes away placements, visits, and services as we see fit.233

Older children, in fact, are unlikely to believe that an adult will cede control to a
child.2 3"
New Mexico's youth attorney rule has the potential to compound this problem by
changing the role of the lawyer from guardian ad litem to traditional attorney in the
middle of a proceeding.2 35 The child, who will likely be confused by the role of a
traditional lawyer, must also be able to understand that the guardian ad litem he or
she has come to rely upon can no longer act in the same manner. 236 As the court
noted in Joanna V., "We are dealing, after all, with children,...who we cannot
expect to appreciate the subtle shades and nuances of our law that surface when an
attorney changes roles. 237 Joanna V. at least had the benefit of distinct proceedings
-first child protective proceedings, then delinquency proceedings-to help separate
her lawyer's roles.238
Misunderstandings about the attorney's role can result in ineffective representation.239 Without understanding, the child is unlikely to participate in the consultations necessary for good decision making or to seek confidential advice from the
attorney.24° The adult burdens of decision making and lawyer direction can also have
the effect of "re-victimizing" the child who is unprepared to deal with them.24 The
mere context of the abuse and neglect proceeding can make it more difficult for the
child to understand what is happening.242 Pressures from families, the court process,

233. Id
234. Id. at 1709.
235. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10(E) (2005). By default, when a child who enters the system before the age of
fourteen turns fourteen, the child's guardian ad litem will continue representing the child as an attorney. See supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
236. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Joanna V., 2004-NMSC-024, 15, 94 P.3d 783,
787 ("[The guardian ad litem] may be the professional with the longest term, on-going involvement with the child

over time.....).
237.
238.
239.

Id.1 16,94 P.3d at 787.
See supra Part ll.F.4.
Buss, supra note 50, at 1712.

240. Id.
241.

Duquette, supra note 66, at 448. The original victimization refers to the abuse inflicted on the child. Id.

"Re-victimization" refers to the harms that may be caused when a child faces pressure to misidentify or misarticulate
his or her own interests because of pressure from family and the court process. Id.
242. Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriersto the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL
L. REV.895, 929 (1999). Specific factors affecting the child's understanding include infrequent contact between
the attorney and the child as well as the introduction of many other adults (such as doctors and teachers) and legal

professionals (such as the judge, the other party's attorneys, and other court personnel) at one time. Id.
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and the abuse or neglect itself can lead children to misidentify or misarticulate their
*
243
own interests.
Much oof the confusion arises simply because children normally
have little if any exposure to lawyers (except through television) and because the
lawyer-client relationship differs from most other childhood relationships. 244 In
short, the child is being forced to "form and sustain a relationship of the most
peculiar sort."245

By avoiding abrupt transitions, however, many of the above problems can be
alleviated or avoided. "If lawyers approach their representation of child clients with
the expectation that the children will be prepared to assume control of representation
as soon as that role is explained, lawyers likely will fail, and fail most
abysmally.... ,246 Children's law expert Emily Buss suggests that a teaching
approach, wherein the lawyer gradually exposes the child to decision making and
control, may result in modest success.247 Under this approach, the attorney would
only take a position in court as directed by the child.'l If the attorney notices that
the child is resisting the decision-making role, then the attorney would not take any
position in court.2 49 This approach is consistent with the attorney's professional
obligation to "educate her client about what to expect in the course of representation
and to clear up any confusion that the lawyer detects., 211 When the attorney is
unable to take a position, he or she would still participate in the proceedings, asking
about the factual and legal bases for the other parties' actions and ensuring that the
state's actions comply with the law. 2"'
Approached gradually in this way, the transition required by the New Mexico
statute252 can be used to prepare the child for the guardian ad litem's new role as a
traditional attorney. Under the 2005 amendment, the guardian ad litem is now
required to present the child's expressed wishes to the court. 5 3 While the guardian
ad litem does not have the option to take no position, as recommended under the
teaching approach, he or she can use the opportunity to explain how the presenting
of expressed wishes will be similar to the client-directed model the lawyer will
eventually follow as a traditional attorney. By calling the child's attention to the
process, the lawyer can help the child understand the child's own influence over the

243. Duquette, supra note 66, at 448.
244. Buss, supra note 50, at 1706-07.
245. Buss, supra note 242, at 926. Children are likely to show considerable deference to their attorney
because they "have spent much of their young lives learning the appropriate ways to behave around adults, and they
have suffered the consequences at the hands of these authority-bearing adults when they failed to learn fast enough."

Id. at 932.
246. Id. at 956.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Id.
250. Id. at 957. Buss refers to the preamble of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that "a
lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their

practical implications." MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDuCt pmbl. '1 2 (2002). Education of the client is also
consistent with the lawyer's duty to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation." Rule 16-104(B) NMRA.
251. Buss, supra note 242, at 959.
252. See supra note 235.
253. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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process254 and let the child learn about that "most peculiar" relationship.255 Once the
lawyer transitions to the role of traditional attorney, he or she can follow the
teaching approach more closely. While the child who enters the system at age
fourteen or older will not have the advantage of a transition period, he or she can
still benefit from the teaching approach to representation.
B. Application of the Youth Attorney Rule to Pending Cases
The intent of the 2005 amendment is to provide attorney representation in abuse
and neglect proceedings for all children fourteen and older.256 Children in the child
protection system at the time of the amendment were originally covered by the pre2005 statute, which allowed only for representation by a guardian ad litem.25 7 If
representation by an attorney could change the outcome of the proceeding, then the
pending cases
clause of the state constitution could prohibit the appointment of an
258
attorney.
Children in the system at the effective date of the amendment can be affected in
one of two ways, depending on their age at that date. For children who were under
fourteen years of age, the statute requires the appointment of a youth attorney when
the child turns fourteen. 25 9 For older children, the statute requires the appointment
of a youth attorney at the child's next appearance before the court. 260 In either case,
the pending cases clause can be invoked if appointment of a youth attorney affects
the "right" of a party or changes a "rule[]... of procedure," and if the child protection
proceeding is a "pending case."26'
1. The Youth Attorney Rule Puts Protective Proceedings Outside the Formal
Definition of "Pending Case"
In applying the pending cases clause, the courts primarily look to the meaning of
the phrase "pending case. 262 A case becomes pending when it is filed on the docket

254. Buss, supra note 242, at 959.
255. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part D.C.1.
258. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
259. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-1O(E) (2005). The Abuse and Neglect Act provides for the "child's guardian ad
litem [to] continue as the child's attorney" when the "child reaches fourteen years of age." Id. Alternatively, the
court can appoint a different attorney if appropriate. Id. § 32A-4-10(E)(l)-(3).
260. Under section 32A-4-10, any child fourteen or older, who entered the system after the 2005 amendment
went into effect, will be represented by an attorney. Id. § 32A-4-10(C). A strict construction of the statute, however,
might exempt these children from attorney representation. An attorney is appointed only at the inception of an abuse
and neglect proceeding, id., or when a child turns fourteen, id. § 32A-4-10(E). An older child already in the system
when the amendment became effective was past the point of inception and had already turned fourteen. Thus,
neither of the triggering events for appointing an attorney will ever occur. The proposed revision to the children's
court rules, however, calls for appointment of an attorney at the child's first appearance after his or her fourteenth
birthday. ProposedRevisions, supra note 32, at 22. (The proposed rule number is 10-305.1, id., but that number is
already in use. See Rule 10-305.1 NMRA ("Joinder of Parties; Severance; Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.")) When
a statute prescribing a rule of practice or procedure conflicts with a court rule, as here, the court rule prevails.
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 311,551 P.2d 1354, 1358 (1976).
261. N.M.CONST. art. IV, § 34.
262. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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of some court263 and remains pending while an act of the legislature can affect its
outcome. 264 The word "case" has been broadly construed to apply not just to
litigation but also to actions by state regulatory agencies and even the courts themselves when they exercise rule-making authority.265
Two cases show that the pending cases clause applies to children's court
proceedings in general, and to abuse and neglect proceedings in particular. In the
first case, State v. Doe, the defendant challenged a compelled psychological
examination in a delinquency proceeding. 266 The court noted that article IV, section
34 of the New Mexico Constitution required the case to be decided as the Children's
Code provided before June 19, 1981, the effective date of amendment, because "all
events occurred before that date. 267 In the second case, Ashley B.G. v. Fastle,
Ashley B.G.'s mother challenged the grant of a permanent guardianship on the
grounds that she had not received notice of the hearing.26 Although the court made
no mention that Ashley B.G. had been abused or neglected, the permanent
guardianship was probably awarded based on a finding of abandonment. 269 The
court set aside the permanent guardianship and remanded the case to the children's
court for a determination of the best interests of the child. 270 Upon remand, the
pending cases clause required the guardianship to be decided under the statutory
procedure in effect when the original proceeding was initiated.27 '
Abuse and neglect proceedings, which were not addressed by Doe orAshley B.G.,
have the potential to remain pending for a much longer time than delinquency or
permanent guardianship proceedings.2 72 The action begins when CYFD files a
petition with the children's court.273 The children's court resolves all issues of law
and fact to the fullest extent possible in the adjudicatory hearing. 274 An abuse and

263. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part H.E.I.
265. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
266. State v. Doe, 97 N.M. 263, 639 P.2d 72 (1981). The specific section of the Children's Code at question
was NMSA 1978, § 32-1-32(B) (current version at § 32A-2-17(B) (2005)). Doe, 97 N.M. at 265, 639 P.2d at 74.
The court did not cite the date of the code edition, but instead referred to the code as it existed "before the effective
date of [the 1981] amendment." Id.
267. Doe, 97 N.M. at 265, 639 P.2d at 74. By "events," the court most likely meant the filing of the petition
on February 13, 1981, and the motion to transfer, made on March 17, 1981. Id. Filing of the petition would make
the case "filed on the docket of some court," which makes the case pending for purposes of article IV, section 34.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
268. Ashley B.G. v. Fastle, 1998-NMCA-003, 952 P.2d 463. Although permanent guardianship proceedings
fall under the Abuse and Neglect Act, they can be held independently of an abuse and neglect proceeding. Ronald
A. v. State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't, 110 N.M. 454, 455, 797 P.2d 243, 244 (1990).
269. The effective statute in Ashley B.G. provided that the court can establish a permanent guardianship when
"the child has been abandoned by his parents." NMSA 1978, § 32-1-58(C)(1) (1987). The current version of the
statute allows the court to establish a permanent guardianship when "the child has been adjudicated as an abused
or neglected child." Id. § 32A-4-31 (C)(1) (2005). The current statute encompasses abandonment, however, because
a neglected child includes a child "who has been abandoned." Id. § 32A-4-2(E)(1) (1999).
270. Ashley B.G., 1998-NMCA-003, 1 14, 952 P.2d at 467.
271. Id. 1 14, 952 P.2d at 467. The original petition was filed under NMSA 1978, § 32-1-59 (1987). Ashley
B.G., 1998-NMCA-003, 2,952 P.2d at 465. At the time of the appeal, the statute had been superseded by NMSA
1978, § 32A-4-32 (1993). Ashley B.G., 1998-NMCA-003, 2, 952 P.2d at 465.
272. See supra Part II.A.
273. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 41, 108 P.3d 543,557;
see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
274. FrankG., 2005-NMCA-026,1 41, 108 P.3d at 557; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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neglect adjudication is immediately appealable to the court of appeals,275 but the
children's court retains jurisdiction during the appeal so that it can take further
action in the case. 276 These further hearings are essential to protect the rights of both
the parents and the child.277 This entire set of hearings is a continuum of proceedings
that does not end until the dismissal or termination of parental rights,278 or when the
child reaches eighteen years of age. 27 9 Because the children's court retains control
during this entire time, the case remains pending.2 80
Although legislation that modifies the Children's Code can implicate the pending
cases clause, modification by itself is insufficient. In order to invoke article IV,
section 34, the legislation must also have the potential to affect the outcome of the
case. 28' Legislation can directly impact the outcome by affecting a party's ability to
achieve a particular result, 282 such as by changing the remedial interest rate available
2
to a party283 or by changing the maximum sentence available in a criminal case. 1
Clearly, the youth attorney rule does not have a similar direct impact; it merely
provides certain children with client-directed representation. 285 Representation by
a youth attorney rather than a guardian ad litem does not change the possible
outcomes of a protective proceeding, such as permitting the child to remain with his
or her parents subject to prescribed conditions, 286 placing the child under protective
supervision of CYFD,2 87 or terminating parental rights.288 Under this formal test,
then, abuse and neglect proceedings are not pending under article IV, section 34 for
purposes of applying the youth attorney rule.
2. The Youth Attorney Rule Brings Protective Proceedings Under the
Functional Definition of "Pending Case"
Legislation can also indirectly impact the outcome of a case by merely affecting
a right or procedure in a pending case. 289 Representation of the child in an abuse and
neglect proceeding is, by statutory definition, a right. 2 ' Although the statutory right
is given to the child, the child's representation protects the parents' procedural

275. FrankG., 2005-NMCA-026, 41, 108 P.3d at 558.
276. Id. 1 42, 108 P.3d at 558.
277. Id.
278. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, 25, 94 P.3d 796, 804.
The court later emphasized the unitary nature of the proceedings, noting that "the process due at each stage should
be evaluated in light of the process received throughout the proceedings." Id. 1 35, 94 P.3d at 807.
279. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-24(F) (1993) ("When a child reaches eighteen years of age, all neglect and abuse
orders affecting the child then in force automatically terminate.").
280. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part I.E.1.
282. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
286. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-22(B)(1) (2005).
287. Id. § 32A-4-22(B)(2).
288. Id. § 32A-4-28.
289. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
290. The youth attorney rule is set out in the section of the Children's Code entitled "Basic rights." NMSA
1978, § 32A-4-10 (2005).
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rights.29' Thus, anything that affects the child's right to representation also affects
the parents' rights. More directly, under the 2005 amendment, parents lost the right
292
to petition the court to remove the child's representative under certain conditions.
By its plain language, article IV, section 34 can be implicated whether the
affected right is substantive or procedural,293 though some confusion exists as to
whether the clause is implicated when the rights are substantive. 294 The distinction
between substantive and procedural rights is often unclear.295 Generally, substantive
law creates, defines, or regulates rights, whereas procedural law sets out the means
for enforcing those rights.29 Procedural provisions cannot abridge, enlarge, or
modify substantive rights.297
In the context of an abuse and neglect proceeding, the children's substantive
rights can be defined either as the right to live with their parents unless a court finds
the parents unfit or, alternatively, as the right to be separated from their parents
whenever their parents are actually unfit. 29 8 The right to counsel does not appear to
fall under either definition of substantive rights, and, in fact, it is traditionally
considered a procedural due process right.29 On the other hand, the youth attorney
rule creates a right, and creation of a right is substantive. 300 How a right is
implemented-that is, the rules for appointing the youth attorney-is procedural.3 '
This discussion illustrates the confusion surrounding the substance-procedure
dichotomy, both in classifying the youth attorney rule and in implicating the

291. Frank G. involved the appeal of a children's court adjudication of abuse and neglect. State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 1, 108 P.3d 543, 545. The court held that
"[plarents' rights to procedural due process were not violated" because, in part, "a guardian ad litem had been
appointed for the Child." Id. 1 37, 108 P.3d at 556; see also State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v.
Candice Y., 2000-NMCA-035, 999 P.2d 1045. In FrankG., the court stated: "[Parents] fail to point to any evidence
that shows that they were prejudiced by the conduct of the [child's] guardian ad item or that their interests were
adversely affected to a degree that would cause [the court] to be concerned about the fairness or propriety of the
determination of abuse and neglect." Id. 1 33, 999 P.2d at 1054.
292. The statute allows that "[any party may petition the court for an order to remove a guardian ad litem
on the grounds that the guardian ad litem has a conflict of interest or is unwilling or unable to zealously represent
the child's best interests." NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-7(C) (2005). In contrast, the section defining the powers and duties
of the child's attorney makes no mention of a similar right. See id § 32A- 1-7.1.
293. The constitutional provision merely says that "[n]o act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy
of either party." N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 34. The adjectives "substantive" and "procedural" do not appear in front
of the word "right." See it
294. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984) (recognizing the
difficulty of distinguishing substance from procedure and noting that NMSA 1978, § 38-3-9 had been characterized
by the New Mexico Supreme Court at various times as both substantive and procedural); Ammerman v. Hubbard
Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 310, 551 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1976) ("[Ihe line between substance and procedure is often
elusive...."); In re Daniel H., 2003-NMCA-063, 18, 68 P.3d 176, 180 ("The distinction between a procedural and
a substantive provision is frequently difficult to draw.").
296. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335; see also In re DanielH., 2003-NMCA-063, 18,68 P.3d
at 180.
297. In re Daniel H., 2003-NMCA-063, 118,68 P.3d at 180 (citing Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 256, 149
P.2d 795, 796 (1944)).
298. Guggenheim, supra note 203, at 1429-30.
Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Ruth Anne E., 1999-NMCA-035, 26, 974 P.2d 164,
299. State ex rel.
App.
171 (citing L.V. v. W.V., 482 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Neb. 1992)); accord In re A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729, 732 (111.
Ct. 1993).
300. See supranote 296 and accompanying text.
301. Id. Similarly, the "creation of a right to appeal is substantive, [whereas] restrictions on the time and place
of exercising this right are procedural." State v. Garcia, 101 N.M. 232, 234, 680 P.2d 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1984).
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pending cases clause. The functional definition of "pending case," however, clears
up the confusion. The functional definition states that if legislation can affect the
outcome of a case, then it is prohibited by the pending cases clause.30 2 The youth
attorney rule changes the lawyer's role from a best-interests model to a clientdirected model.30 3 The legal standards governing the conduct of a lawyer can greatly
influence a case. 3°0 The revised role will help the attorney act more effectively,
thereby improving the fact-finding ability of the court. 30 5 The change in role from
guardian ad litem to traditional attorney thus can affect the outcome of the
proceeding.3 6
The youth attorney role could also negatively affect the outcome of the proceeding. If the child becomes confused by the attorney's role, effective representation
may become more difficult than with a guardian ad litem. 307 New Mexico
recognized this confusion in Joanna V. when one lawyer represented a child as a
guardian ad litem in an abuse and neglect proceeding and as a traditional attorney
in a delinquency proceeding.30 8 Similarly, the court's understanding of the case may
be hampered if the attorney is unable to reveal confidential information." For
example, in the cases of EsperanzaM. 31 0 and Candice Y.,31 1 the respective guardians
ad litem told the court that their clients were lying when they said that they were not
abused. Under the youth attorney rule, however, a traditional attorney may not have
been able to reveal such information.3" 2
Functionally, then, the youth attorney rule can affect a pending case by changing
the outcome of an abuse and neglect proceeding. The effect can be positive, by

302. See supra Part i.E. 1.
303. See supra Part I.C.
304. DUQUETrE ET AL., supra note 192, ch. VII. For example, a traditional attorney can have a "mediating
effect" by expediting the resolution of disputes, helping minimize contentiousness between adult parties, and
facilitating the settlement of contested issues. Mandelbaum, supra note 24, at 62.
305. See In re Jamie TT, 599 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (App. Div. 1993) ("The appearance of a lawyer to protect
[the child's] interests seems clearly necessary to avoid an erroneous outcome unfavorable to [the child] in the
proceeding."); Jacob Ethan Smiles, A Child's Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect
Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485, 501 (2003) ("Unlike a guardian ad litem, an attorney will represent
the voice of the child, which will provide the court with more information and improve its fact-finding ability,
allowing the court to make a more informed decision.").
306. Buss, supra note 242, at 926 ("The lawyer's advocacy might change the outcome of the case (the best
evidence of influence)."); Ramsey, supra note 226, at 297 ("[D]ecisions might be more accurate, not necessarily
because the child's view was correct, but because another point of view would be presented."). More generally, any
kind of adult advocate can directly affect the outcome of the case. Guggenheim, supra note 203, at 1414.
307. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. "When the child lacks [understanding of the client-lawyer
relationship], the lawyer's representation is incoherent." Buss, supra note 50, at 1724.
308. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Joanna V., 2004-NMSC-024, 94 P.3d 783; see supra
Part II.F.4 (discussing the facts of Joanna V.). The Abuse and Neglect Act now specifically prohibits such
representation. NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-7(I) (2005) ("A guardian ad litem shall not serve concurrently as both the
child's delinquency attorney and guardian ad litem.").
309. Hazlewood, supra note 19, at 1066. The Texas Family Code provides an exception for information
relating to abuse and neglect. Id.
310. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 955 P.2d 204; see
supra Part II.F. 1 (discussing the facts of Esperanza M.).
311. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Candice Y., 2000-NMCA-035, 999 P.2d 1045; see
supra Part II.F.2 (discussing the facts of Candice Y.).
312. New Mexico prohibits a lawyer from "reveal[ing] information relat[ed] to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation." Rule 16-106 NMRA. Although the rule impliedly allows disclosures
when appropriate to the representation, that authorization is limited by the client's instructions. Id. cmt.
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improving the child's representation and thereby aiding the court.3" 3 The effect can
also be negative by confusing the child and keeping important information
confidential." 4 The language of the constitutional provision does not discriminate
between positive and negative effects, however, so any effect on the outcome would
make abuse and neglect proceedings pending under article IV, section 34.315
3. The Right to Attorney Representation Existed Before the Youth Attorney
Rule
Even if appointment of a youth attorney can affect the outcome of an abuse and
neglect proceeding, the pending cases clause will not be implicated if the right
existed before the legislation went into effect.3 16 Functionally, if the child could have
been represented by a client-directed attorney before the effective date of the
amendment, then such representation after the effective date will have no new effect
on the outcome.317
In the simplest situation, a procedural modification that merely changes the
method for implementing or enforcing an existing right without changing the
underlying right does not implicate the pending cases clause.31 8 Thus, under article
IV, section 34, the process for appealing a judgment or the specified date for filing
motions can be modified so long as the appeal or motion are still available. 1 9
More important to the youth attorney rule, codifying an existing common-law
right does not affect that right. In Arnijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,
the defendant's train struck the plaintiff's car, killing the driver. 32' A New Mexico
statute prevented the defendant from introducing a "seat belt defense."32 ' The
defendant argued that the statute violated equal protection by taking away the right
to argue the seat belt defense.322 The court, however, held that the common law had
not created a seat belt defense, so a statute prohibiting the defense could not affect
the substantive rights of either the defendant or the plaintiff.323 In the words of the
never was a 'seat belt defense' and there still is not a 'seat belt
court, "there
324
defense."
The New Mexico Court of Appeals was soon faced with a challenge to the same
statute, this time based on article IV, section 34.32 In Mott, the section of the statute

313. See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 307-312 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Part ll.E.l.
316. See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
317. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. The two examples noted in the text are from In re
Held Ordersof U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 1999-NMSC-024, 16, 981 P.2d 789, 794, and Heron v. Gaylor, 53
N.M. 44, 49, 201 P.2d 366, 369-70 (1948), respectively.
320. 754 F. Supp. 1526, 1528 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in parton other grounds, 19 F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1994),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 27 F.3d 481 (10th Ci. 1994).
321. Id. at 1534 (citing NMSA 1978, 66-7-373(B) (1989)). Under a seat belt defense, the failure to wear a
seat belt would constitute negligence or negligence per se on the part of the plaintiff and could be used to limit or
apportion damages. Id.
322. Id. at 1535.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Mott v. Sun Country Garden Prods., Inc., 120 N.M. 261, 264, 901 P.2d 192, 195 (Ct. App. 1995).
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prohibiting the seat belt defense had been deleted before the plaintiff brought the
action but was reinserted while the case was pending.326 The court adopted the
reasoning of Armijo in finding that no substantive rights were affected, and, thus,
the reinserted statute did not violate the pending cases clause. 27
The same analysis holds when an existing right is later codified. In State ex rel.
Hannah v. Armijo, 328 an action was brought to disqualify a district judge. 329 The
statute allowing for the disqualification procedure had been passed before the case
was pending but did not become effective until after the case was pending. 33 ° The
court held that the right to disqualify judges had always been present in the state
constitution, so the statute merely "vitalized" that right-it did not change a rule of
" ' Before
procedure.33
the statute was enacted, parties were free to adopt an
appropriate procedure for disqualification; after it was enacted, they were merely
required to follow the procedure in the statute. 332 Because no right was affected, and
because a change in presiding judge could have occurred for other reasons before
the statute was passed,
the application of the statute was not prohibited by the
333
pending cases clause.
Similar to Hannah, the youth attorney rule codifies an existing right. Illinois has
interpreted its own abuse and neglect statutes as providing children the right to
representation by a client-directed attorney of their choice.33" Under the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act, minors subject to a juvenile proceeding have "'the right to be
represented by counsel."' 33 5 In an abuse and neglect proceeding, this right is
specified as representation by a guardian ad litem.33 6 In the abuse and neglect
proceeding of In re A. W., the child A.W., a thirteen-year-old minor, asked the court
to replace her guardian ad litem with an attorney of her choice.337 The court noted
338
that the child's right to counsel is "almost coextensive to that afforded to adults,
because, under the Act, children have "'the rights of adults, unless specifically

326. Id. at 264, 901 P.2d at 195. Section 66-7-373(B) of the New Mexico Statutes was deleted in 1991, the
plaintiff brought the action in 1992, and the seat belt provision was reinserted at section 66-7-373(A) in 1993. Id.
at 264, 901 P.2d at 195.
327. Id. at 266, 901 P.2d at 196.
328. 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933).
329. Id. at 74, 28 P.2d at 511.
330. Id. at 82, 28 P.2d at 516.
331. Id. at 83, 28 P.2d at 516.
332. This is almost identical to the situation in Heron where motions had customarily been heard upon notice,
but during a pending case a new procedure set a specific day of the month. Heron v. Gaylor, 53 N.M. 44, 49, 201
P.2d 366, 369-70 (1948); see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
333. Hannah, 38 N.M. at 83, 28 P.2d at 516. Gesswein cited Hannahfor its finding that no right was affected
by the statute. State ex reL Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 771, 676 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1984). Gesswein,
however, found that changing the rules of disqualification would affect a pending case as defined by article IV,
section 34. Id. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338.
334. In re A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729, 733 (IM.App. Ct. 1993).
335. Id.at 732 (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, 801-5(1) (West 1991) (current version at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(1) (2003))).
336. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 37,1 802-17(1) (West 1991) (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/217(1) (1998)) ("Immediately upon the filing of a petition...the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
if: (a) such petition alleges that the minor is an abused or neglected child.").
337. In re A.W., 618 N.E.2d at 730. A.W.had located a private firm that was willing to act as her attorney in
a pro bono representation. Id.
338. Id. at 732.
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339
precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such minors. ,, Starting with
the extent of the child's rights, and comparing to other jurisdictions that recognize
a child's right to choice of counsel, the court held that the Illinois statutes give
°
children the right to substitute counsel of their choice.' This right is not absolute,
however, but subject to the discretion of the court based on whether the child was
manipulated or coerced into substituting private counsel.34'
The pre-2005 New Mexico statutes were very similar to Illinois' and thus should
afford children a similar right to choose counsel. Under the pre-2005 statute,
42
children had a right to be represented by a guardian ad litem. Although the New
Mexico statute did not explicitly state a "right to be represented by counsel" as in
33
Illinois, the guardian ad litem acted as counsel for the child. 4 Furthermore, as in
Illinois, the rights of the child were to be "the same basic rights as an adult, except
as otherwise provided in the Children's Code." 34 New Mexico recognizes that a
345
party has a right to be represented by counsel of his or her own choosing, subject
to rejection by the court only for a compelling reason.46 If New Mexico children are
to have the same rights as adults, then like in Illinois that should include the right
to substitute counsel of their choice. 47
Thus, children had a right to client-directed representation before the 2005
4
amendment was enacted, even though that right may never have been exercised. '
To paraphrase the court in Armijo, there always was a "right to an attorney" and
there still is a "right to an attorney.""M 9 As in Hannah, the right existed without a
procedure, and the 2005 amendment "vitalized" that right by providing a procedure
for its implementation.35 ° Furthermore, the amendment does not take away any right,

339. Id. (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 37,1 801-2(3)(a) (West 1991) (current version at 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/1-2(3)(a) (1998))).
340. Id. at 732-33.
341. Id. at 733.
342. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-l0(C) (1993) ("During an abuse and neglect proceeding, the court shall appoint

a guardian ad litem for a child at the inception of the proceeding."). In New Mexico, guardians ad litem must also

be attorneys, although they do not act in the role of a traditional attorney. NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-4(l) (2005). This
was also the case before the 2005 amendments. Id. § 32A-I-4(J) (2003).
343. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 39, 955 P.2d
204, 213 ("We do not believe that a conflict ... necessarily requires that the guardian ad litem withdraw as counsel
for the child.") (emphasis added). If guardians ad litem truly are counsel for children, then the youth attorney rule
merely changes how children exercise that right to counsel.
344. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10(A) (1993). The language remains unchanged in the current statute. Id. § 32A4-10(A) (1995).
345. Sanders v. Rosenberg, 1997-NMSC-002, 9, 930 P.2d 1144, 1146 (citing Chappell v. Cosgrove, 1996-

NMSC-020,

7, 916 P.2d 836, 838).

346. Id. (citing Chappell, 1996-NMSC-020,

'1 7,

916 P.2d at 838).

347. This position would also be consistent with the recommended ABA standards for the child's attorney,
which state that "[t]he court should permit the child to be represented by a retained private lawyer if it determines
that this lawyer is the child's independent choice, and such counsel should be substituted for the appointed lawyer."
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 65, § H-5.
348. A search of New Mexico case law turns up no instances of children requesting substitute counsel in an
abuse and neglect proceeding.
349. Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 754 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (D.N.M. 1990).
350. See supra notes 331-332 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the 2005 amendment can be seen as
merely modifying the way in which the existing right to counsel is exercised. See supra note 343 and accompanying
text.
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as argued unsuccessfully in Armijo:35 1 the court can still appoint a guardian ad litem
when circumstances warrant. 2 Because children could have been represented by
an attorney before the amendment was passed, the pending cases clause does not
prohibit appointment of an attorney for all children fourteen and older, regardless
of when they entered the protective system. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
New Mexico significantly changed its Children's Code by requiring that all
children fourteen years and older in abuse and neglect proceedings be represented
by a traditional attorney. The new rule intends for such children to be treated like
adults, at least by their legal representatives. By relying on the existing rules of
professional conduct to define that role, however, the youth attorney rule leaves
open the possibility that older children may not get the full voice that the legislature
intended. Past decisions that held that the role of the guardian ad litem is consistent
with the rules of professional conduct create the additional risk that youth attorneys
could act in the same role as a guardian ad litem. Only by paying careful attention
to the lawyer-client relationship and by educating the child about the nature of legal
representation can the youth attorney remain true to the intent of the statute and at
the same time improve the outcome of the proceedings for the child.
For children who were in the system and under fourteen years old when the
amendment became effective, a technicality presents a potential roadblock to
appointment of a youth attorney. The pending cases clause of the state constitution
prevents application of legislation to ongoing cases. The courts' interpretation of
this clause has sometimes been inconsistent, but an extensive review of the case law
shows that the decisions can be reconciled by viewing the functional effect of
legislation on the results of pending cases rather than the formal language of the
clause. While the youth attorney rule can affect the outcome of the case, thereby
invoking the clause, the common law right to counsel of choice shows that the youth
attorney rule "vitalizes" an existing right and thus avoids the effect of the pending
cases clause.

351. See supra notes 322-323 and accompanying text.
352. Rule 16-114(B) NMRA ("A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or conservator or take other
protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately
act in the client's own interest."). The court can also disqualify counsel if necessary to protect the interests of the
child. See Sanders v. Rosenberg, 1997-NMSC-002, 1 10, 930 P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (holding that, to protect the
interests of children, the court has broad equitable power to disqualify counsel for reasons other than violation of
an ethical or court rule). This provides a limitation similar to that of Illinois', which allows the court to intervene
if the child was manipulated or coerced. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.

